Documentation

Upload rules

peryx validates normalized identity, verifies each declared digest, and resolves version-scoped mutations against the served release. The tables list accepted inputs, rejected inputs, and rejection messages. See upload compatibility for the design and HTTP endpoints.

Import a directory

peryx import-dir loads local wheels and gzip-compressed source distributions into a hosted index:

peryx import-dir root/pypi ./dist --data-dir /var/lib/peryx
peryx import-dir hosted ./dist --config peryx.toml

The index argument accepts a hosted name, a hosted route, or a virtual route with a hosted upload target. The command walks the directory tree and applies the same upload checks to .whl and .tar.gz files. It skips unsupported files and rejects invalid distributions.

Output is tab-separated:

status  filename  project  version  reason

Each row has an imported, skipped, or rejected status and a reason. A summary row reports the three counts.

Distributed ingress admission

A PyPI client uploads to whichever datacenter it reaches. This section applies when availability.mode is dc or ha. Mode none commits validated bytes and metadata to the local backend without an ingress ledger, authority transfer, or replication worker.

Before peryx stores the upload, the ingress datacenter records durable admission. It streams the bytes to a staged blob and records a durable write intent bound to the tenant (the upload route), the ecosystem authority key (the normalized project), the artifact digest, the byte size, the ingress datacenter, and an operation id. Admission succeeds only once both the bytes and the intent are durable in that datacenter, so an accepted upload survives a restart near the client. Publication, home-datacenter assignment, and cross-datacenter replication run after admission and are not part of it.

SituationStatusResult
A new upload is streamed and staged200One intent is recorded, bound to the identity above
The same filename and content is resent200The resend resolves the same intent; no bytes are staged twice
The same filename is resent with different content400File already exists: "<name>" has different content; use a different filename
The declared digest does not match the bytes400<field> mismatch, before an intent is recorded
The backend cannot prove same-datacenter durability503same-datacenter durability unavailable: <guarantee>
The authority is at its retention record ceiling503ingress admission retention is full: authority is at its record ceiling, with a Retry-After
The next intent would cross the byte ceiling503ingress admission retention is full: authority is at its byte ceiling, with a Retry-After

Idempotency. The intent is keyed by the upload's file identity within its tenant and authority, so a retried upload resolves one intent rather than staging its bytes a second time. A client that loses the response and resends the same distribution is admitted again and publishes the same file idempotently; a resend of the same filename carrying different bytes is refused with the same error publication returns, so the client-visible upload contract is unchanged.

Checksums. The sha256_digest, blake2_256_digest, and md5_digest a client declares are verified against the streamed bytes before admission records anything, so a checksum mismatch is rejected with its existing error and leaves no staged intent. See the digest fields peryx verifies below.

Same-datacenter durability. Admission requires the configured blob backend to prove race-safe, integrity-checked writes. Create-if-absent prevents a concurrent writer from clobbering a staged artifact, and checksum validation rejects corrupted writes. A local filesystem proves both. An object store proves them only when its endpoint honors conditional writes and checksum validation; one that cannot is refused at admission rather than acknowledging an upload it cannot make durable.

Retention limits and backpressure. The retention buffer is bounded per authority, not globally: each authority stages up to a record ceiling and a byte ceiling, so one busy project cannot starve the ledger of every other while a home outage holds writes un-finalized. A new intent is refused once its authority holds its record ceiling, or once admitting it would cross its byte ceiling. Admission trips backpressure at 80% of either ceiling, one shed signal before the hard bound. The node admits an upload that crosses the soft threshold and logs the authority's retained records and bytes so an operator sees capacity pressure building before writes are refused. When an authority reaches a hard ceiling, a further upload is shed with 503 and a Retry-After so the client backs off and retries rather than losing the write; the buffer drains as the home finalizes the retained intents.

Order, retention, and expiry. Every admission takes the next value of a durable, never-reused sequence, and the pending set is keyed by it. After a restart, the node resumes the drain in admission order across interleaved authorities instead of key order. The node retains a pending intent because its write may still finalize, so a stalled home sheds new load through admission rather than by dropping work in flight. A finalized intent, or one that expired without finalizing, is pruned once the retention window has passed since its last transition, which returns its slot to the authority's ceiling.

Partition behavior. Admission may retain bytes and intent state during a home outage, but it never publishes metadata or changes home authority: those run downstream once the home is reachable. A datacenter in a control-plane minority therefore keeps admitting and retaining eligible uploads durably near the client, and the retained intents drain at the new home once authority transfers to a survivor.

Finalization. Admission stages the upload; the authority's home datacenter turns it into a release. That step validates the intent against current state and commits the metadata and its journal entry in one transaction. See finalizing admitted uploads for the fence, the validation checks, and how a retry replays one result.

Project size quota

An index policy can set max_project_size_bytes for hosted PyPI uploads. The limit counts each distribution file's logical size under its normalized project. Files that existed before quota accounting was enabled are not backfilled; the counter starts at zero and grows through metered uploads.

SituationStatusResult
Projected counted bytes are within the limit200File and reservation commit together
Projected counted bytes exceed the limit403Rule max-project-size; no file metadata publishes
The policy enables quota_audit200File publishes and the durable reservation records the hit
Validation, storage, metadata, or status failsvariesNo file publishes and reserved project bytes return to zero
The request is cancelled or disconnectedvariesPending project bytes are released
The filename already holds the same content200No new allocation

The denial reason remains project size <total> would exceed limit <limit>. It is returned as the existing JSON policy denial with action upload, field project_size, and rule max-project-size. Lowering a limit below current counted use rejects later counted uploads; project pages and file downloads remain available.

A virtual upload route and its hosted target can both configure the limit. The lower value applies. When both set a limit, audit behavior requires quota_audit = true on both; either enforcing layer makes the combined decision enforce. Quota decisions increment peryx_pypi_quota_admitted_total or peryx_pypi_quota_rejected_total under the hosted role. The metric series contain no project names.

Wheel .dist-info matching

Every wheel carries one *.dist-info directory holding its METADATA, WHEEL, and RECORD. PEP 427 names it {distribution}-{version}.dist-info. peryx checks that this directory names the same project and version as the wheel filename before it reads those files, so a wheel cannot claim to be requests-2.32.5 while shipping another project's metadata.

Compared wheel names

peryx derives the project name and version from the filename, then reads the project name and version from the .dist-info directory, and compares the two by value:

  • Project name. PEP 503 normalization on both sides: lowercase, and collapse every run of -, _, or . into a single -. Flask, flask, and FLASK are one name; Foo.Bar, foo_bar, and foo--bar are one name.
  • Version. PEP 440 parsing and equality, not string equality. 1.0 and 1.0.0 are the same version, as are 1.0rc1 and 1.0RC1.

The directory's stem (everything before .dist-info) is split into name and version at its last hyphen, matching how the filename splits. peryx does not require the directory bytes to equal the normalized filename bytes. An archive whose directory is spelled the un-normalized way older build tools wrote it is accepted, which is what pip and Warehouse (pypi.org) do. For why, see un-normalized wheels.

Accepted

Each of these wheels is accepted; the filename is on the left, the directory the archive actually contains on the right.

Wheel filename.dist-info directoryWhy it matches
Flask-0.12-py2.py3-none-any.whlFlask-0.12.dist-infoFlask and flask normalize the same
foo_bar-1.0-py3-none-any.whlFoo.Bar-1.0.dist-infoFoo.Bar and foo_bar normalize to foo-bar
pkg-1.0-py3-none-any.whlpkg-1.0.0.dist-info1.0 and 1.0.0 are equal under PEP 440

Rejected

peryx rejects a directory whose identity disagrees with the filename, and any archive without exactly one .dist-info. For a wheel filed Flask-1.0-py3-none-any.whl, expected flask-1.0.dist-info:

.dist-info directoryError
other-1.0.dist-info.dist-info directory other-1.0.dist-info does not match expected flask-1.0.dist-info
flask-2.0.dist-info.dist-info directory flask-2.0.dist-info does not match expected flask-1.0.dist-info
flask.dist-info.dist-info directory flask.dist-info does not match expected flask-1.0.dist-info
nonemissing .dist-info directory
two or moremultiple .dist-info directories found: ...

A directory with no hyphen in its stem, such as flask.dist-info, has no version segment to parse and so cannot match. A version that does not parse as PEP 440 fails the same way. Every failure is an invalid wheel: message and a 400 on upload.

Required wheel files

peryx reads METADATA, WHEEL, and RECORD from the directory the archive contains, spelled the way the archive spells it, not from the normalized name it computed. A missing one of these is a distinct missing required <dir>/METADATA (or WHEEL, or RECORD) failure.

Upload digest fields

The legacy upload API lets a client declare a content digest of the file it sends. peryx accepts three digest fields and verifies whichever the client declared against the bytes it staged. A correct digest passes; a wrong one is rejected.

Accepted fields

An upload's multipart form may carry any of these fields alongside the content part:

FieldAlgorithmHex length
sha256_digestSHA-25664
blake2_256_digestBLAKE2b-25664
md5_digestMD532

Any one of them suffices, and none is required. peryx always computes the SHA-256 it content-addresses the file by, independent of what the client declares, so an upload that declares no digest at all is still stored. twine and uv publish normally send all three; older tooling and minimal CI scripts sometimes send md5_digest alone.

Wheel verification

peryx hashes the staged bytes with SHA-256 and BLAKE2b-256 as it reads the upload stream, so verifying a declared sha256_digest or blake2_256_digest costs nothing beyond a comparison. It verifies each field the client declared:

  • sha256_digest against the content SHA-256 it computed.
  • blake2_256_digest against the content BLAKE2b-256 it computed.
  • md5_digest only when it is the sole declared digest, meaning neither sha256_digest nor blake2_256_digest is present. peryx does not compute MD5 while staging, so this is the one case that reads the staged content a second time. When a stronger digest is declared, that verification already covers the bytes, and peryx leaves the declared MD5 unverified rather than re-reading the file.

The check is the same regardless of field: the declared value must be lowercase hex of the field's length and must equal the digest peryx computed.

Rejections

A declared digest that does not match the content is a 400:

ConditionStatusMessage
md5_digest disagrees with the content400md5_digest mismatch
sha256_digest disagrees with the content400sha256_digest mismatch
blake2_256_digest disagrees with the content400blake2_256_digest mismatch
a digest is not lowercase hex of its length400<field> value "<value>" is not lowercase hex with the expected length

The mismatch message is always <field> mismatch, naming the field that disagreed. A wrong md5_digest is only reached when MD5 is the sole declared digest; when a stronger digest is present peryx verifies that one and never inspects the MD5.

Digest scope

peryx does not advertise MD5 downstream. The simple-index entry for a stored file carries a sha256 hash and no md5, so clients read and verify the artifact by SHA-256 regardless of which digest the uploader declared. MD5 is a weak hash; peryx accepts it on upload for parity with the index it fronts, not as a content guarantee it re-serves.

Attestations

The upload multipart form may carry an attestations field: a JSON array of PEP 740 attestation objects. When present and valid, peryx stores the bundle and publishes a provenance URL on the file's Simple API entry; when absent, the file publishes with no provenance.

Declared-digest validation

Validation binds every attestation to the uploaded distribution and bounds the untrusted input. peryx does not verify signatures, certificates, or transparency-log inclusion.

CheckRule
Field shapeA JSON array of at least one object; at most 32 attestations
VersionEach attestation's version is 1
Envelopeenvelope.statement is base64 that decodes to a valid in-toto statement
Subject digestSome subject's digest.sha256 equals the uploaded file's SHA-256
Subject nameIf that subject names a file, the name equals the upload filename
Per-attestation sizeEach attestation is at most 256 KiB
Aggregate field sizeThe whole attestations field is at most 1 MiB
Statement sizeA decoded statement is at most 64 KiB
Parser depthThe field must parse within the JSON recursion limit; deeper nesting is rejected

Publication is atomic

A valid bundle and its distribution publish in one transaction. Any validation failure returns 400 and publishes neither the file nor its provenance. The 400 body names the offending attestation by index and the reason, for example attestation 0 subject digest does not match the uploaded distribution or attestations field carries 40 attestations; at most 32 are accepted.

Stored and served digests

peryx wraps the accepted attestations into a provenance object {"version": 1, "attestation_bundles": [{"publisher": null, "attestations": [...]}]}, stores it content-addressed in the blob store keyed by the artifact's digest, and serves it at .../files/{sha256}/{filename}.provenance with media type application/vnd.pypi.integrity.v1+json. The publisher is null because peryx does not resolve a Trusted Publisher identity. See Simple API serving for the served shape.

Requiring predicate types

An index whose [index.policy] sets required_attestations makes an upload carry a PEP 740 attestation for every listed in-toto predicate type. peryx evaluates this after the structural, digest, and attestation-binding checks above and after the neutral project, size, and tag rules, so a file rejected on one of those reports that denial first. The requirement matches predicate types verbatim against the predicateType each bound attestation declares; it verifies no signature, certificate, or transparency-log entry.

SituationStatusRule
Every required predicate type is presentpassesnone
A required predicate type is missing (enforce mode)403required-attestation
A required predicate type is missing (audit mode)passesrequired-attestation-audit

In enforce mode the 403 body is a policy denial whose reason names the missing types, for example upload is missing a required attestation predicate type: https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1, without echoing bundle content. In audit mode the upload publishes and peryx records the required-attestation-audit decision instead of rejecting. Either way the decision is persisted to the policy-decision log. An upload with no attestations satisfies no requirement.

Version matching for admin operations

The version-scoped admin operations address a release by version: yank, un-yank, delete, and promote. Each reads the version recorded on every upload of the project and acts on the files whose version matches the one in the request. The match is PEP 440 equality of the release, not a byte-exact comparison of the two strings, so a request addressed to 1.0.0 reaches a file uploaded with form version 1.0.

Version-matching rule

Two versions match when either holds:

  • their strings are byte-identical, or
  • both parse as PEP 440 versions and those parsed versions are equal.

When either string fails to parse as a PEP 440 version, only the byte-identical case remains: the comparison falls back to exact string equality. This is the same equality the served project page applies when it decides which files a version filter shows, so an operation and the page it acts on agree on what one release is.

Equivalent versions

PEP 440 equality normalizes the release segment, so trailing-zero spellings of the same release are equal, while a different release, or a version carrying a distinct local segment, is not.

RequestedRecorded on uploadMatchWhy
1.0.01.0yessame release, 1.0 == 1.0.0
1.0.0.01.0yessame release, trailing zeros normalize
1.0.0.01.0.0yessame release
1.0.01.0.1nodifferent release
1.0+build1.0.0+buildyessame release and same local segment
1.0+build1.0nolocal segment present on one side only
1.0.0nightlynonightly does not parse; byte comparison fails
nightlynightlyyesneither parses; byte-identical

Record fallback

Matching reads the version stored on each upload record, the form value captured when the file was published, not a value re-derived from the filename. When that stored string is not a parseable PEP 440 version, or the requested version is not, the comparison is byte-exact: an unparseable recorded version matches only a request that spells it the same way. Delete relies on this. When the served-page filter matches nothing, delete falls back to matching on the stored record, and the two notions of equality have to agree or the fallback misses the file it should remove.

Scope

The rule governs every version-scoped form of these endpoints:

  • PUT /{route}/{project}/{version}/yank and its DELETE un-yank
  • DELETE /{route}/{project}/{version}/
  • PUT /{route}/{project}/{version}/promote?from=...

The project-wide forms that carry no version, such as PUT /{route}/{project}/yank, act on every file of the project and never compare versions.

Version-matching scope

The match is equality of one release, not a range or a prefix. A request for 1.0 does not reach 1.0.1 or 1.1. It does not ignore the local segment: 1.0+build and 1.0 are distinct releases. And it never rewrites a stored version; the record keeps the spelling it was uploaded with, and matching is decided per request.

Mutation paths for verb-named projects

peryx names its mutation actions in the URL. A PUT yanks, restores, or promotes; a DELETE deletes or un-yanks. The action is the last path segment: PUT /{route}/{project}/yank, DELETE /{route}/{project}/yank (un-yank), PUT /{route}/{project}/{version}/restore. yank, restore, and promote are also legal PEP 503 project names, so a project can be named after the verb that acts on it.

Mutation-path grammar

peryx peels a trailing action segment only when a project segment precedes it: the text left after removing the verb must end in /, so the request names a project before it names an action. A path that is nothing but the verb is not an action, it is the project. Names are compared after PEP 503 normalization, so Yank, YANK, and yank are the same project and collide the same way.

The table uses route root/pypi and a project whose normalized name is yank.

RequestMeaning
DELETE /root/pypi/yank/delete the project yank
DELETE /root/pypi/yank/1.0/delete version 1.0 of yank
PUT /root/pypi/yank/yankyank every file of yank
PUT /root/pypi/yank/1.0/yankyank version 1.0 of yank
DELETE /root/pypi/yank/yankun-yank the project yank
PUT /root/pypi/restore/restorerestore the project restore

promote is always versioned and takes from={source route}, so its verb-named form is PUT /root/pypi/promote/1.0/promote?from=staging to promote version 1.0 of the project promote. A promote without a version answers 400 with promotion requires a version, verb-named or not.

Accepted verb-named projects

peryx used to strip the verb even when it was the whole path, reading the request as the action on an empty project. DELETE /root/pypi/yank/, a delete of the project yank, parsed as an un-yank of a project with no name and failed validation with 400 Bad Request. The project named yank had no working project-level delete: its own name shadowed the action. The versioned delete DELETE /root/pypi/yank/1.0/ and the project-level yank PUT /root/pypi/yank/yank already worked, because each puts a project segment before the trailing token.

The scope was narrow. DELETE peels only yank, so yank was the one project name whose project-level delete broke; restore and promote never collided on DELETE. The fix drops the whole-path case from the grammar for every verb, so a project named after any mutation verb stays addressable on both methods.

Not affected

Uploading a project named yank, restore, or promote was never blocked; the collision lived only in the mutation router, and the upload path parses the name straight. Every request above takes the same upload token as any other mutation, and a 200 carries the number of files affected, a 404 means nothing matched.

Operational checks

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